01Map
Estate, exposure, data holdings and identity model documented.
You getAn asset and exposure inventory, frequently the first one that exists.A scanner will hand you four thousand findings. Almost none of them are how you would realistically be breached. We work from what an attacker would do against your estate, and fix that first.
Automated tooling is useful and it is not a strategy. It reports what it can detect, weighted by generic severity, with no knowledge of what your systems hold or how they are reached. The result is a backlog nobody can finish and everybody stops reading.
The questions that matter are narrower. What is exposed to the internet? What holds data that would damage you? Who has standing access they no longer need? And if someone got in this morning, how long before anyone noticed?
We work from those, then use the scanner output as supporting evidence rather than as the plan. Findings are ranked by exploitability against your specific estate and the consequence if exploited.
That usually produces a first list of ten to twenty items, not thousands, most of which can be closed within a quarter. It also produces a defensible narrative for a board, which the raw output never does.
A scanner ranks by generic severity. We rank by whether it is reachable in your estate and what happens if it is reached.
Real risk behind a genuine barrier. Planned into the next cycle, not treated as an emergency.
Internet-facing, unauthenticated, and it reaches something that matters. Usually a handful of items, and they are the entire first conversation.
The bulk of any scanner report. Recorded for completeness, not worth a programme.
Cheap to close and worth doing together, but not at the cost of delaying the quadrant above.
Whether the driver is ISO 27001, SOC 2, a customer questionnaire or a regulator, the substance is broadly the same. Building it once serves all of them.
Who can reach what, whether that access is still justified, and how quickly it is removed when someone leaves. Standing privileged access is the most common serious finding we see.
What data you hold, where it lives, how long you keep it, and whether anyone can answer those questions without a two-week exercise.
Whether changes to production are reviewed, recorded and reversible. A good CI/CD pipeline satisfies more of an audit than most teams realise.
Not just scanning, but a process with owners and timescales, and evidence that findings are actually closed.
Whether you would know. Retention long enough to investigate, and alerting on the events that matter, not on everything.
A plan that names people rather than roles, and that has been rehearsed at least once against a realistic scenario.
Zero trust is a sound principle wrapped in a great deal of marketing. The principle is simply that being inside the network should not by itself grant access — every request is authenticated, authorised and logged regardless of origin.
Implemented as a product purchase it disappoints. Implemented as a sequence of changes to identity, segmentation and access, it materially reduces how far an attacker can move after an initial foothold, which is the outcome that matters.
Security found in a yearly penetration test is security found expensively and late. Most of it can be caught on the merge that introduced it.
Known vulnerable packages caught on every build, with automated upgrade pull requests where the fix is clean.
SCA in CIInjection, unsafe deserialisation and common flaws flagged before review rather than after deployment.
SAST in CICredentials caught before they reach the repository, and rotation triggered when one slips through.
Pre-commit & CITerraform plans checked against policy, so a public storage bucket fails review rather than becomes an incident.
Policy as codeBase images checked and rebuilt on a schedule, because a container built last year carries last year's vulnerabilities.
Registry scanningA short structured conversation when a design touches authentication, data or external exposure.
Design reviewEstate, exposure, data holdings and identity model documented.
You getAn asset and exposure inventory, frequently the first one that exists.Applications, cloud configuration, identity and process examined against real attack paths.
You getFindings ranked by exploitability and consequence.A working session with your technical team and a separate one for leadership.
You getA remediation plan with owners, effort and sequence.Fixes delivered by us, by your team, or split — whichever is faster for you.
You getClosed findings, and the pipeline controls that stop them returning.Verification of closure, then continuous scanning and periodic review.
You getEvidence of closure suitable for an auditor or a customer questionnaire.The three below are the ones this page does not already answer. Anything more specific, put it to us directly.
You are secure against what that test looked at, on the day it looked. A penetration test is a point-in-time sample of a defined scope, and estates change weekly — a new integration, a contractor's standing access, a dependency with a newly published vulnerability. The teams with good postures treat the annual test as verification of a continuous process, not as the process itself. If dependency scanning, secret detection and infrastructure policy checks are not running on every merge, most of what next year's test finds will be things that could have been caught the day they were introduced.
We can build and evidence the technical controls, and we work alongside your auditor rather than replacing them — certification requires an accredited body and we are not one. What is worth understanding before you start is that both standards largely attest that you do what you say you do. That makes them valuable as a forcing function and misleading as a security guarantee: a poorly secured organisation with excellent documentation can certify. We would rather help you build controls that reduce risk and then evidence them, than assemble a policy set that passes an audit and changes nothing operationally.
Multi-factor authentication everywhere, then remove standing administrative access, then make sure you have backups you have restored from. Those three account for a disproportionate share of real-world breach prevention and recovery, and none of them requires a large programme or a new product. After that, get an inventory — you cannot protect what nobody has written down, and the exercise itself usually surfaces two or three systems everyone had forgotten were still reachable from the internet.